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CASES NOTED
Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n case,' 4 the court deter-
mined that contempt should be invoked only when there is an evident need
for summary action to protect the public and the jurisdiction of the court.
It is not to be encouraged for punishing trivial or unimportant instances of
illegal practice of the law.'5
In the absence of a regulatory statute the contempt citation of the
court is substantially the only method for punishing unauthorized practice,
but where other remedies are available and efficient, they should first be
invoked.16 Criminal contempt is a summary proceeding and, as such, dan-
gerous. Where a statute makes the unauthorized practice of law a crime, as
in the instant case, summary action is merely an alternative method, the
results of which might be unjust when compared with the ordinary protec-
tion afforded in the processes of the criminal courts.' 7
CONFLICT OF LAWS - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
CONFLICTING DECREES IN SISTER STATES
Petitioner divorced respondent in Illinois in 1939, and was awarded
alimony in installments for as long as she should remain unmarried. In
1944, in Nevada, petitioner married one Henzel who had obtained a Nevada
divorce from a resident of New York. After this Nevada decree had been
declared void' by a New York court, petitioner obtained a New York decree
of annulment of her marriage to Henzel,2 and then married a third man.
Petitioner then filed suit, asserting diversity jurisdiction, in district court in
Illinois, for unpaid installments of alimony from respondent for the period
from the Nevada marriage to her third presumably valid marriage in New
York. Held, on certiorari, that the New York decree of annulment was
entitled to full faith and credit and the Nevada decree of divorce was not,
but that the effect of the annulment on respondent's obligation to pay ali-
mony should be determined in the district court under Illinois law. Sutton
v. Leib, 72 Sup. Ct. 398 (1952).
The problem suggested in the instant case is one whose growth may
be traced from the second Williams4 case, which affirmed that it was not a
denial of full faith and credit5 for a sister state to make separate inquiry
14. 255 R.I. 122, 179 At!. 139 (1935).
15. Id. at 129, 179 Aft. at 142.
16. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 At].
139 (1935); In re Bugasch, 12 NJ. Misc. 788, 175 Atl. 110 (1934).
17. People ax rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 366, 8 N.E.2d 941,
951, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728, rehearing denied, 302 U.S. 777 (1937) (dissent);
In re Baker, 85 A.2d 505, 515 (N.J. 1951) (dissent).
1. By means of a separate maintenance proceeding instituted by Henzel's first wife.
2. This judgment declared that petitioner's marriage to Henzel was "null and void"
for the reason that he "had another wife living at the time of said marriage."
3. 188 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1951).
4. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
5. U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
into the jurisdictional facts of a foreign divorce. This right of separate
inquiry permitted a state to declare invalid, on grounds of lack of jurisdic-
tion, domestic decrees of a sister state, although this right was later pre-
cluded8 in cases wherein the defendant spouse had made voluntary appear-
ance.7
Then came the concept of the "divisible divorce,""s by which the proper-
ty rights of a marriage were allowed to be separated from the status itself.
Thus, even where a foreign ex parte divorce was valid, an apparently con-
flicting and contradictory judgment of another jurisdiction was held to be
enforcable in the courts of that jurisdiction: e.g., a separate maintenance
decree was enforceable even though the husband bad secured an absolute
divorce in another jurisdiction. Even in the case of conflicting findings of
jurisdiction, however, the right of collateral attack has been denied to per-
sons who were not parties to the action, such as a child of the former
marriage.1 0
In the case of conflicting domestic decrees of two sister states, which of
them should be given full faith and credit by a third state? It must be
noted at the outset that this situation occurs rarely, and the handful of
cases must be viewed with caution. The decision may rest upon some rules
of preference for one judgment over another, or it may depend upon the
court's interpretation of the substantive law which gave rise to the judgments.
An example of the latter method of decision is seen in a case" wherein a
New York separate maintenance decree was sought to be enforced in Califor-
nia against a husband who had a Nevada divorce. There it was held that
the Nevada decree prevented the enforcement of the New York decree on
substantive grounds-that is, that separate maintenance depended on the
continuance of the marital relationship.
2
The former criteria are used in a group of cases which set forth certain
temporal standards of preference. In Trienes v. Sunshine Mining Co.' 3
there were conflicting judgments between a Washington state court and a
federal court in Idaho as to the ownership of stocks. The Supreme Court
implied that the proceedings latest in time were those to which full faith
and credit must be given.' 4 The same rule appears to have been held good
6. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
7. But Sherrer may not have solved even this problem. See de Marigny v. de
Marigny, 193 Misc. 189, 81 N.Y.S.2d Z28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
8. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
9. But the Sherrer rule is followed where the wife appears in the foreign proceed-
ing, even though the issue of separate maintenance is not raised. Lynn v. Lynn, 302
N.Y. 193, 97 N.E.2d 748 (1951).
10. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951)
11. Chirgwin v. Chirgwin, 26 Cal. App. 2d 506, 79 P.2d 772 (1938).
12. Contra: Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
13. 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
14. Accord: Hartman v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1948) (" . . that it
is the judgment in the proceedings latest in time which is the one that must be given
the full faith and credit").
CASES NOTED
in a California case"' in which the court was called upon to decide between
conflicting decrees of New York and Philippine Islands courts. Certain
other cases seem to have taken no cognizance of this rule.16 The "latest
in time" solution has been hinted at in the Restatement of Conflicts,7 and
inchoately appears in two older cases. 8
There have not yet evolved any clear standards for the determination
of such issues as these-nor even any clear cut divisions of authority. The
instant court, while giving other reasons for its decision, actually moved
along the same lines as the "latest in time" cases. This is a particularly
muddy portion of a whole field greatly in need of clarification, and hope is
expressed that the Illinois district court in its forthcoming decision "may let
in more light to the student."'19
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DIRECT ACTION STATUTE VS.
"NO ACTION" CLAUSE - IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT
The plaintiff brought suit directly against a foreign insurer for injuries
resulting from the use of the insured's product. In accordance with a Lou-
isiana statute, the defendant had filed written consent to be sued directly
as a condition precedent to doing business in that state. Upon suit, the
defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the policy, valid in the state
where made, stipulated that the insurer could not be stied for indemnifica-
tion until the claim against the insured was liquidated. Held, that the
statute depriving defendant of this valuable contract right is unconstitutional.
Bish v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. Ltd., 102 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La.
1952).
The problem of whether a state can enlarge contractual Obligations
made outside its borders appears when dealing with foreign corporations
doing local business. While a state may completely exclude foreign corpora-
tions,' impose certain conditions on their entry and operation2 and regulate
their local business,' the Fourteenth Amendment 4 forbids state legislation
15. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 720, 132 P.2d
70 (1939); see McKee v. McKee, 239 Iowa 1093, 32 N.W.2d 379 (1948)) (Texas
modification of Iowa decree entitled to full faith and credit); Darraugh v. Carrington,
62 N.Y.S.2d 241 (App. Div. 1946).
16. Hammel v. Britton, 19 Cal. 2d 72, 119 P.2d 333 (1942) (California court re-
fused full faith and credit to Colorado's setting aside of a Colorado decree upon which
a California judgment was based); Passailaigue v. Herron, 38 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1930).
(Federal court in Florida refused to recognize a Louisiana decree cancelling a Louisiana
divorce).
17. RESTATEMEIT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 450, comment b, illustration 1 (1934).
18. Piedmont Coal Co. v. Green, 3 W. Va. 54, 98 Am. Dec. 799 (1868); Peet v.
Hatcher, 112 Ala. 514, 21 So. 711 (1896).
19. SroaRY, TaE CONFLICT oF LAws ix (3d ed. 1846).
1. Bothwell v. Buckabee-Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274 (1927).
2. Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946).
3. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 272 U.S. 295 (1926).
4. U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
